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On 30 November, the heads of state of the partner states of the
East African Community (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania
and Uganda) met in Kampala to approve the Protocol for the
Establishment of an East African Monetary Union. The
Protocol – the EAC equivalent of Europe’s Maastricht Treaty –
offers a roadmap for monetary union and provides the enabling
legislation for the regional institutions, including an East
African central bank, which will usher in a single East African
currency by 2024.[1]
Compared to the fanfare with which, in 2007, the same heads
of state committed themselves to fast-tracking monetary union
by 2012,[2] the launch of the Protocol was a modest affair. In
part this reflected the reality that the half-decade of debate
leading up to the launch of the Protocol has proceeded against
the backdrop of the sobering morality play of the Eurozone
crisis. This was, in many respects, perfect timing for the EAC
negotiators: the travails of Europe have served to focus the
mind on a range of critical issues of implementation and
operation, on questions of cross-border surveillance, of the
design of macroeconomic convergence criteria, the structure
and operation of the institutions of a putative union, and so
forth. But it also served a more important purpose, namely to
emphasise that monetary union has rather little to do with
monetary policy per se; it is a fundamentally political step that
entails profound issues about the pooling and ceding of fiscal,
economic and political sovereignty. Not surprisingly, then, as
the idea of East African monetary union has moved from a
vague aspiration closer to a firm commitment, so the initial
exuberance has given way to (very) cautious pragmatism. The
convergence criteria embedded in the Protocol are extremely
demanding; the horizon for eventual monetary union is
attenuated and highly conditional, while the concept of
‘variable geometry’ – that individual EAC members may not
qualify or may choose to opt out of monetary union – is now
fully entrenched in the Protocol. The prospect of a single
currency zone within the otherwise single market of the EAC is
now clearly an option.
A second reason for caution has been the profound changes to
the dynamics of the East African Community, changes that
were difficult to envisage during the five years of detailed
preliminary analysis carried out by the EAC central bank
governors (on which IGC-Tanzania has been an important
advisor). Most fundamentally, the discovery and development
of substantial natural resources across the region – from oil in
Uganda and Kenya and the enormous aquifer in Turkana,
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Northern Kenya, to the offshore natural gas reserves of the
Indian Ocean basin off the coast of Tanzania – will decisively
reconfigure the equilibrium towards which partner states must
eventually converge. The balance of gains and losses within a
putative union, for individual partner states and the region as a
whole, has shifted radically. And to reinforce this point, even
the anticipated membership of the EAC is set to change in a
manner not originally anticipated: the original five partner
states – the ‘big three’ countries of Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania along with Rwanda and Burundi – are set to be joined
by South Sudan and Somalia,[3] while the prospect of the DRC
joining is not impossible.[4]
This sobriety was, to an important degree, anticipated in work
carried out by the IGC for the EAC central bank governors as
they drafted the Protocol (Adam et al. 2012). The IGC work
focused on how countries might conduct exchange rate (and
hence monetary) arrangements in the transition to monetary.
The central theme of this work – now integrated into the
Protocol itself – was how partner states should seek to position
themselves on an uncertain and potentially long glide path to
eventual monetary union and the introduction of a single
currency managed by a single supra-national central bank
without jeopardising the significant progress towards
macroeconomic stability they have achieved in the last two
decades.
The core components of this process include a coherent and
credible set of macroeconomic convergence criteria, sustained
and structural fiscal discipline, and a set of union-wide
institutions capable of coordinating national economic policies
during the convergence phase and beyond, of implementing and
enforcing robust macroeconomic surveillance and of operating
effective financial sector regulation.
But an equally challenging question is how best nominal
exchange rate arrangements should be configured to support
this process (see Table 1). Here the lessons from Europe are
informative but not necessarily applicable. The core European
economies have long revealed a preference for heavily managed
exchange rate arrangements, from almost immediately after the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system. From early on, national
currencies were free to float relative to third-party currencies
but only provided that they remained close to each other, and
by the early 1990s the core European currencies were more or
less in lock-step around the Deutschmark.
Table 1 Options for exchange rate management in the EAC
during the convergence phase
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Notes: *The bold italics show descriptive short-hands for these
options. 
Source: Adam et al. (2012).
In sharp contrast to the European countries, the large countries
of the EAC have spent more than a decade operating flexible
exchange rate regimes, and these have underpinned successful
macroeconomic stabilisation. Tight exchange rate commitments
would therefore not be appropriate for the EAC for a
convergence phase that is likely to be of uncertain duration.
Nor is any single member of the EAC naturally poised to play
Germany’s role of delegated anchor. For these reasons, systems
that feature tight exchange rate commitments, like the external
grid operated by the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council,
or that combine such commitments with a delegated anchor, as
in the Eurozone, are not appropriate for the EAC. The IGC
work favoured, instead, the maintenance of a float system
during the convergence phase, in which national authorities
continue to operate existing frameworks in which monetary
aggregates or inflation targets, rather than exchange rates, serve
as the anchors for inflation. The final conversion phase – in the
final months before full monetary union – would then feature
what might be called a collective anchor system. Partner states
would commit to a grid of intra-union exchange-rate parities,
supporting these with possibly coordinated intervention where
needed, but continuing to anchor the overall system through
monetary aggregates and/or inflation targets.
Monetary union in East Africa is far from a done deal, and for
many setting the high bar for convergence set out in the
Protocol is very welcome, for whilst the costs of delaying a
move to monetary union are likely to be mild, the risks
associated with precipitate union are numerous and substantial.
So while progress towards a new regional currency, with all the
implications this brings, may be slow and the ultimate objective
many never in fact be achieved, the path on which the Protocol
places the region has already generated enormous positive spill-
overs in the areas of policy cooperation and coordination
between partner states. These are most immediately visible in
the areas of monetary and financial sector policies; rapid
progress is being made in areas such as the harmonisation of
cross-border settlement systems, information exchange,
regulatory behaviour, and discussion on reserve pooling and
policy coordination. Similarly, as countries engage more deeply
with the broader questions of macroeconomic and structural
convergence, similar payoffs will emerge in the domain of fiscal,
trade and labour market policies. Perhaps most importantly of
all, however, the experience of setting down the road to
monetary union while the crisis in the Eurozone unfolds not
only reinforces the point that successful economic and monetary
union requires member states to relinquish sovereignty to a
much greater degree than was, perhaps, initially thought, but
also provides some lessons to the EAC states on how this deep
political bargain can be secured.
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Notes
[1] The Protocol is available on the East African Community
website at http://www.eac.int/.
[2] The heads of state are almost the same group as in 2007,
except for President Kibaki of Kenya who has been replaced by
President Kenyatta.
[3] Negotiations are well under way with South Sudan while the
Heads of State considered Somalia’s application to join the EAC
at their Kampala summit.
[4] See http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/We-want-to-join-
you-DRC-tells-regional-
bloc/-/2558/964372/-/view/printVersion/-/26a8td/-/index.htm
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